Chinese experts worked inside sanctioned Russian drone plant

Post by : Meena Rani

Documents and travel records indicate that Chinese drone specialists have visited IEMZ Kupol, a Russian state-owned defence manufacturer under Western sanctions, multiple times since mid-2024 to assist with drone development, testing, and training related to one-way attack and VTOL surveillance drones, according to security officials.

Shipments and intermediaries

The records, including invoices and bank statements, show Kupol received shipments of Chinese-made one-way attack drones produced by Sichuan AEE and other companies. These deliveries were routed through a Russian procurement firm, TSK Vektor, which is also subject to U.S. and EU sanctions.

Corporate documents reviewed confirm deliveries of AEE attack drone models, including the A140 and A900, and list additional models such as the A60, A100, and A200 for future shipment. Flight test reports show these systems were tested at Russia’s Chebarkul military range in late 2024.

On-site technical collaboration

Kupol records describe visits by groups of Chinese technical staff to the company’s Izhevsk facilities, where the guests assisted with drone assembly and trained Kupol personnel. The same teams also attended flight tests at the Chebarkul site and departed Russia shortly afterward, according to airline booking records. Security officials assessed that some visitors described in Russian letters as TSK Vektor employees were in fact staff of the Chinese manufacturers.

Among the Chinese firms mentioned are Sichuan AEE and Hunan Haotianyi. Documents indicate that AEE invoiced TSK Vektor more than 5 million yuan in the second quarter of 2025 for several A200 drones equipped with anti-jamming systems. Separate flight test reports evaluated a VTOL drone (HW52V) produced by Hunan Haotianyi for potential reconnaissance and strike roles.

Garpiya line and component links

The reporting also ties Chinese components and technical inputs to Kupol’s Garpiya family of one-way attack drones, which are modeled on Iran’s Shahed series and have been used extensively in Ukraine. Previous investigations documented Chinese engines and parts being routed to Kupol and disguised as civilian equipment to evade export controls, a pattern that accelerated Garpiya production.

Security officials noted that the combination of small shipments of assembled drones, component flows, and on-site technical support could enable Kupol to expand both production scale and the range of drone models it manufactures. A Kupol letter also referenced collaborative work on flight control computers and a new drone referred to in documents as the GA-21, which analysts assess may be related to Iran’s Shahed-107 family.

Responses and wider implications

China’s foreign ministry stated it was not aware of the cooperation and emphasized a policy of not supplying lethal weapons to parties in the Ukraine conflict while strictly controlling dual-use exports. The Russian government, the defense ministry, and Kupol did not respond to requests for comment.

Analysts say the disclosures underline how Chinese commercial drone technology — and components such as small engines, guidance units, and flight controllers — have become significant enablers for Russian drone programs. This trend has prompted concern in the U.S. and Europe, leading to sanctions on a number of firms and intermediaries connected to the transfers.

What remains unclear

The documents and officials do not fully describe the legal channels used for the shipments. The exact contractual relationships between Kupol, TSK Vektor, and the Chinese manufacturers remain undisclosed, and some details were withheld by sources for sensitivity.

China-Russia defence cooperation; IEMZ Kupol; Sichuan AEE